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NOTE
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE
AVAILABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Arbitration provides an economical and expeditious method
for litigants to resolve disputes outside of the judiciary.' Despite
See Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Role of Public Policy, 58 N.W.U. L. REv. 545
(1964) ("arbitration has emerged as inexpensive, speedy and favored way to settle disputes
without resorting to the courtroom". . .); see also Goldstein, Alternatives for Resolving
Business Transaction Disputes, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 69, 78 (1983) (arbitration offers more
privacy and convenience while reducing formality); Raymos, Punitive Damage Awards in
Maritime Arbitration: A Legitimate Part of the Arbitrator's Arsenal?, 10 MAa. LAW. 251,
253 (1985) (arbitration compared favorably to judicial procedures because of economy and
speed).
Unlike professional lawyers and judges, arbitrators are not "steeped in the rules of pro-
cedure and evidence." Id. at 253. One scholar has called the arbitrator "a peculiar breed,"
not limited at all to any one method of decision making, even entitled to follow the divine
word should he or she so choose. Fowks, The Arbitrator: As a Punisher and As a Profes-
sional, 47 KAN. B.A. J. 7, 10-11 (1978).
Arbitration has been viewed as a voluntary contractual arrangement and, as such, has
been highly favored by the courts. See Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 415 F. Supp. 535, 543
(D. Neb. 1976) (arbitration offers parties a reasonable expectation of a fair adjudication);
Mendelson v. Shrager, 432 Pa. 383, 385, 248 A.2d 234, 235 (1968) (arbitration encouraged
and "favored by the courts"); see also Lea Tai Textile Co. v. Manning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F.
Supp. 1404, 1406 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Uniform Commercial Code utilized in construing contrac-
tual aspects of arbitration clause); Pillott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047, 363
N.E.2d 460, 463 (1977) (arbitrators become judges by choice of the parties involved).
The objective of maintaining inexpensive and time-saving arbitral procedures manifests
itself throughout the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association
("AAA"). See, e.g., Com. Arb. Rules § 14 (1977) (seven-day time limit for appointment of
neutral arbitrator); id. § 17 (generally only one arbitrator employed to hear dispute). The
average duration of an arbitration procedure under the AAA rules is four to five months.
Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A-B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 78, 80. Furthermore, it
is usually unnecessary for a successful complainant to have a court confirm the award,
clearly a significant expense, since it is well-recognized that arbitrators have the final word
and courts will generally not overturn an arbitrator's award. See Robbins, Securities Arbi-
tration: Preparation and Presentation, 42 ARB. J., June 1987, at 3, 14; see also infra note 5
(discussing grounds for modifying or vacating arbitrator's award).
1988] COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
initial concern that arbitrators with varied legal abilities would en-
croach upon judges "rightful" control over American legal affairs,
modern state and federal courts now look favorably upon arbitra-
tion2 and substantial latitude has been afforded arbitrators in fash-
ioning remedies.' Hence, commercial arbitration has burgeoned as
Notably, arbitrators often have no legal background or training, nor do they necessarily
possess any particular expertise in the matter of the arbitration. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
How ARirrRATION WORKS 120 (4th ed. 1985). Rather, the most important quality for an
arbitrator has proven to be that of impartiality. Id. at 119. In some disputes, however, a
specific expertise is considered essential. Id. This is especially true in cases involving medi-
cal or engineering issues. See generally Kanner, The Dynamics of the Arbitration Process,
39 ARB. J., June 1984, at 57, 57 (high degree of quality in labor arbitration is necessitated
due to ongoing contractual relationship in post-arbitral period); Note, Awarding Punitive
Damages in Medical Malpractice Arbitration, 20 CAL. W.L. REv. 312, 315 n.26 (1984) (medi-
cal malpractice arbitrators are "highly sophisticated and competent" fact finders unlike
emotionally susceptible jurors).
2 State court decisions favoring arbitration include: School City v. East Chicago Fed'n
of Teachers, Local 511, 422 N.E.2d 656, 661 (Ind. App. 1981); Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache
Sec., Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 500, 506, 495 N.E.2d 345, 348, 504 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85, cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 402 (1986); and Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 629, 389 N.E.2d 456, 458-59, 415
N.Y.S.2d 974, 976-77 (1979).
Among favorable federal court decisions are: Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mer-
cury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42 (10th Cir.
1986); Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1984); Weissbuch
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 1977).
'See, e.g., South East Atlantic Shipping Ltd. v. Garnac Grain Co., 356 F.2d 189, 192
(2d Cir. 1966) (arbitrator found to have acted properly in assessing party's "business moral-
ity" prior to determining award); School City, 422 N.E.2d at 662 (arbitrators, in granting
relief, not bound by principles of substantive law). Arbitrators' power to grant "extraordi-
nary remedies" was recognized as far back as the late 1920's. See Hoellering, Remedies in
Arbitration, 20 FORUM 516, 517 (1985).
Attorney's fees may become part of the award if expressly provided for in the arbitra-
tion clause itself. See, e.g., Stermer v. Modiano Constr. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 264, 272-73, 118
Cal. Rptr. 309, 314-15 (1975) (agreement may provide payment of attorney's fees to winning
party in breach of contract dispute); see generally M. DomKE, DomiKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATrON § 43.01, at 536 (rev. ed. 1987) (discussing importance of parties' agreement in
awarding attorney's fees). A minority view among courts allows the arbitrator to award at-
torney's fees even if the parties' arbitration agreement did not provide for such. See J.R.
Snyder Co. v. Soble, 57 Mich. App. 485, 226 N.W.2d 276 (1975). In Snyder, the arbitrator's
award included a provision for "reasonable attorney's fees," although there was no mention
of this in the arbitration agreement, and the trial court affirmed a $4,000 attorney's fee. Id.
at 486-87, 226 N.W.2d at 277, 279. In affirming the expansive view of arbitrators' powers
taken by the lower court, the appellate court sustained the award and noted that "[e]ven if
the question were properly before us we would not be disposed to disallow the fee." Id. at
491, 226 N.W.2d at 279.
In addition, "as between court and arbitrator, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
when a court has determined that the subject matter of a dispute is arbitrable, procedural
questions 'which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to
the arbitrator.'" F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 223 (quoting John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)).
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a means of settling breach of contract and tort actions when the
parties have agreed to forego the more traditional judicial setting.4
The arbitral award now enjoys the protection of statutes defining
those circumstances under which the award may or may not be
overturned or altered by a court.5 These statutory provisions have
often been construed in a light most favorable to sustainment of
the arbitrator's ruling.8 Indeed, because neither procedural nor
' See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 39. Nearly 40,000 arbitration cases
were filed in 1984 alone. Meyerowitz, supra note 1, at 79. As a result of the increase in
arbitrated claims, courts have been forced to devote significant time to enforcing and vacat-
ing clauses and awards. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (award
affirmed); Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527 F.2d 966, 975
(2d Cir. 1975) (clause altered in effort to have it "fit ... new situation"), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 936 (1976).
1 See Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). This section of the Federal Arbitration
Act provides the only statutory grounds upon which an award may be vacated. See id. Sec-
tion 10 provides in pertinent part:
In either of the following cases the United States court ... may make an order
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-(a)
Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. (b) Where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them. (c)
Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing .... or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced. (d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly ex-
ecuted them that a ... definite award.., was not made.
Id. New York and California have similar statutes. Compare N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 7511(b)
(McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1987) with CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982 & Supp.
1987). New York additionally provides for the vacating of an award upon application of a
party not involved with the arbitration if such party's rights were prejudiced by the arbitral
award. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 7511(b)(2) (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1987).
Furthermore, modification of an arbitrator's award is statutorily provided for in the
Federal Arbitration Act when the arbitrator has made a material mistake or miscalculation,
decided a matter not within his or her authority, or failed to grant the award in proper
form. See 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1982).
1 See Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 623-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 679 (1984). In
Baker, a patient and her doctor entered into an agreement whereby "any dispute as to med-
ical malpractice [was to be] determined by submission to arbitration." Id. at 622-23, 208
Cal. Rptr. at 679. The patient's claim for malpractice in performing breast reduction surgery
was taken to arbitration pursuant to the contract. Id. at 622, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 678. As one
part of her prayer for relief, the patient sought punitive damages. Id. The appellant argued
that the California Civil Code did not allow for punitive damages in "professional negligence
claims." Id. at 623, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 679. Notwithstanding the statute, however, the judge
upheld the arbitrator's award of punitive damages, finding that: "An agreement to arbitrate
is a contract .... Although awards may be vacated if the arbitrator has exceeded his power,
any ambiguities in the scope of arbitration are resolved in favor of coverage." Id. (citations
omitted); see also North Cent. Util., Inc. v. East Columbia Water Dist., 480 So. 2d 901, 905-
06 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (burden shifts to defendant to set forth factual basis for vacating
award), cert. denied, 481 So. 2d 1329 (La. 1986). See generally D. SIEGEL, HANDBOOK OF
NEW YORK PRAcTIcE 828 (1978) (only "complete irrationality" will bring about judicial in-
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substantive law governs most of their decisions," arbitrators often
grant rather unconventional decrees.8
terference); Britton, Judicial Review and Enforcement of the Arbitration Award, 16 TRIAL,
Mar. 1980, at 22, 24 (absent compelling reasons, labor arbitration awards will be upheld).
7 See Coast Trading Co. v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1982)
(absent finding of dishonesty in decision making process, arbitrator's award upheld despite
error of law or fact); South East Atlantic Shipping Ltd. v. Garnac Grain Co., 356 F.2d 189,
192 (2d Cir. 1966) (court "bound" by arbitrator's own interpretation of relevant contract
law); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Demarco, 328 Pa. Super. 513, 515, 477 A.2d 563, 564
(1984) (common law arbitration award "not reviewable on basis of an error of law or fact by
arbitrator"); see also M. DoMKE, supra note 3, § 1:01 (arbitrators need not apply any sub-
stantive tort law or established rules of evidence). But see State v. R.A. Civitello Co., 6
Conn. App. 438, 441, 505 A.2d 1277, 1279 (arbitrator's award rendered invalid because statu-
tory formula for damages not employed), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 810, 508 A.2d 770 (1986).
Rather than reviewing statutes or case law, courts look closely at the contract provision to
determine the extent of an arbitrator's power to provide a remedy. See Totem Marine Tug
& Barge, Inc. v. Northern Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979) (arbitrators
derive authority from scope of contractual agreement); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104,
109-10 (9th Cir. 1962) (scope of arbitrator's authority rests on strength of parties'
agreement).
Arbitration hearings stray considerably from trial procedures regarding the scope of dis-
covery. See Nastro, Remedies and Redress in Commodity Disputes: Recourse in the Courts,
35 Bus. LAw. 765, 768 (1980) (discovery in arbitration proceedings is weak and limited);
Robbins, supra note 1, at 5 (AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules do not require sufficient
information with demand or submission, leaving issues cloudy prior to hearing); Smiley,
Stockbroker-Customer Disputes: Making a Case for Arbitration, 23 GA. ST. B.J. 195, 198
(1987) (drawback in arbitration proceedings is the limited opportunity to engage in discov-
ery). The greatly limited discovery available in arbitration hearings diverges considerably
from the wide latitude ordinarily afforded parties in acquiring and demanding production of
evidence in the judicial arena. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26. The federal rules stipulate that "par-
ties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved." Id. (emphasis added). But see 9 U.S.C. § 2 et seq. (1982 & Supp.
1986) (no provision for discovery exists in the Federal Arbitration Act). See generally Note,
Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J.
548, 566 (discovery in judiciary and in arbitration yields "disparate impact" rendering judi-
cial proceedings for Securities Exchange Act claims more favorable).
In addition, while a court is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis in choosing a rem-
edy, arbitrators are not. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 78. Goldstein suggests:
[A]lthough a court may be reluctant to enforce a restrictive covenant in an em-
ployment contract on public policy grounds, an arbitrator, not bound by such con-
siderations, is likely to order adherence to the restriction, and a court then could
give sanction to this award. Indeed, the conventional equity rule, that equity will
not make a decree requiring continual supervision, has been held not to apply to
an award in arbitration that requires continual performance.
Id. at 78-79.
' See, e.g., San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd.,
293 F.2d 796, 799-800 (9th Cir. 1961) (arbitrator's award upheld despite arbitrator's total
disregard of law of unjust enrichment); Grayson-Robinson Shores, Inc. v. Iris Constr. Corp.,
8 N.Y.2d 133, 136, 168 N.E.2d 377, 379, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304-05 (1960) (arbitrator's award
of specific performance of building contract enforced by court). But see Coast Trading Co.
v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1982) (arbitrator's award vacated for
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Notwithstanding the enormous latitude given arbitrators,9
some courts have drawn the line at punitive damages awards, rea-
soning that the inherently penal nature of exemplary damages war-
rants a certain degree of judicial oversight and control.10 As a mat-
ter of policy, it is argued, such punishment is best administered
exclusively by the courts.1' In the leading case of Garrity v. Lyle
its failure to adhere to Trade Rules of American Dry Pea & Lentil Association).
I See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10 Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 356, 353 N.E.2d 793, 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d
831, 832 (1976). Garrity is the leading case in New York prohibiting an arbitrator from
awarding exemplary damages. See id.
In Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1978), the Third Circuit expressed the
quintessential nature of punitive damages:
Punitive damages are not a favorite of the law. Usually assessed both as an exam-
ple and as a warning against particularly egregious conduct, such damages serve
both punitive and deterrent functions. Such awards may be particularly appropri-
ate as a means of vindicating the public interest in preventing violations of civil
rights by state officials. The availability of punitive damages as a deterrent may be
more significant than ever today, in view of the apparent trend of decisions cur-
tailing the powers of [the] federal courts to impose equitable remedies to termi-
nate such violations.
Id. at 105-06.
Notably, prior to Garrity, the New York judiciary appeared to relax its long-standing
hostility towards arbitrators' awards which amounted to penalties. See Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Savin Bros., 36 N.Y.2d 957, 959, 335 N.E.2d 859, 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556
(1975) (overruling Publishers Assoc. v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 280 App. Div.
500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1st Dep't 1952)).
'" See, e.g., Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 338 (2d Cir. 1984)
(punitive damages may only be awarded where specifically mentioned in arbitration con-
tract). But see Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 776 F.2d 269, 270
(11th Cir. 1985) (affirming arbitrator's award of punitive damages for willful fraud claim);
Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 682 (1985) (arbitrator's
punitive damages award upheld in medical malpractice claim where both parties consented
to arbitration of issue).
One commentator has noted that in the context of stockbroker-customer disputes,
"[o]ne of the primary reasons customers' lawyers have traditionally avoided arbitration in
which the broker engaged in fraudulent conduct has been the belief that punitive damages
are unavailable in arbitration." Smiley, supra note 7, at 199. Another author has suggested
that "because arbitration decisions are rarely published, a punitive damage award from a
private arbitral forum may fail to warn potential wrongdoers of the penalty imposed for the
conduct. Note, Punitive Damage Awards in International Arbitration: Does the "Safety
Valve" of Public Policy Render them Unenforceable in Foreign States?, 20 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 455, 480 (1987).
While Garrity held that an arbitrator may never award punitive damages, 40 N.Y.2d at
356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832, not all courts have followed this rule. See, e.g.,
Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, 824 (M.D.N.C. 1983) (arbitra-
tor may award punitive damages when parties' contract so provides). In Willis, the court
interpreted a broad arbitration clause within a brokerage agreement as entitling "any arbi-
trator who may hear this matter to award punitive damages." Id. The court refused to fol-
low Garrity even though the contract provided that New York law would govern, id. at 823-
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Stuart, Inc.,12 for example, the New York Court of Appeals held
that it is against public policy to award punitive damages in arbi-
tration proceedings brought pursuant to an arbitration provision in
the parties' contract. 3 The court ruled that such awards could not
be enforced even when parties had previously authorized an arbi-
trator to grant punitive damages at his or her discretion.1 4 Punitive
damages, the court reasoned, are shaped by attitudinal philoso-
phies about correction and reform and are therefore a matter best
left exclusively to the state's consideration. 5
The United States Supreme Court, in Shearson/American Ex-
24, reasoning that "federal law governs the categories of claims subject to arbitration." Id.
Furthermore, the court explained that "[t]he Court perceives no public policy reason per-
suasive enough to justify prohibiting arbitrators from resolving issues of punitive damages
submitted by the parties." Id. at 824; see also Penna, Punitive Damages and Public Policy,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (discussing alignment among courts with respect to avail-
ability of punitive damages in arbitration).
12 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
13 Id. at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832. In Garrity, the plaintiff-author
instituted a court action to confirm an arbitration award of both compensatory and punitive
damages against the defendant-publisher, based upon the arbitrator's finding that the pub-
lisher had engaged in "malicious" harassment of the plaintiff and "gross[ly]" underpaid the
royalties owed her. Id.
4 Id. Although the court conceded that an arbitrator has authority to "fashion" a rem-
edy according to the wrong done, the majoriy restricted the scope of such remedy exclu-
sively to compensatory damages. See id. at 357, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
"[A]rbitrators are not ... empowered to ride roughshod over strong policies in the law
which control coercive private conduct." Id. at 357, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
Hence, punitive measures were "confine[d] to the State and its courts." Id.
25 Id. at 359, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834. Since punitive damages are either
available or not available as a matter of law, some jurisdictions have developed tests so that
judges may determine the fairness of allowing punitive damages on a more uniform basis.
See, e.g., Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 331 (5th Cir. 1981). Miley rejected the
four-part Texas test of fairness of punitive awards preferring, instead, "a formula of puni-
tive damages equal to three times compensatory damages." Id. Such a formula is consistent
with statutory law. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (antitrust treble damages);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (securities fraud treble
damages); see also Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1350 (9th Cir. 1976)
(punitive damages approximated three times compensatory damages), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1097 (1977); Palmer Coal & Rock Co. v. Gulf Oil Co., 524 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir. 1975)
(same formula used in fraud case), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 969 (1976).
The Sixth Circuit uses a different standard for determining the propriety of punitive
liability: (1) punitive damages may only be awarded in particular cases, such as those involv-
ing fraud or gross misrepresentation; and (2) there must have been actual damage suffered
by plaintiff. Edwards v. Travelers Ins., 563 F.2d 105, 118 (6th Cir. 1977); see also Note,
Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Search for a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV.
272, 295 (1978) (setting forth a model for testing fairness of noncompensatory arbitral
awards).
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press, Inc. v. McMahon, 6 has arguably left the door open on this
issue. In McMahon, the plaintiff-customer brought a civil RICO
claim against the defendant-brokerage firm alleging misrepresenta-
tion and churning of plaintiff's accounts. 7 The defendant sought
to compel arbitration based on a standard arbitration clause pro-
vided in the customer agreement that the plaintiff had signed.18
The plaintiff argued, however, that fraud claims under RICO were
nonarbitrable because of the statute's treble damages provision."9
Emphasizing the civil nature of the RICO claims, the Supreme
Court concluded that such claims were arbitrable. 20 The Court
stated that the treble damages provision was intended to play pri-
marily a remedial role.2' State courts may thus find themselves re-
evaluating their own policies with regard to the permissibility of
punitive damages in arbitration awards.2
16 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
1" Id. at 2336. In addition to the claims brought under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982), plaintiff also alleged viola-
tions of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1982), and
common law tort/fraud theories. See McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2336.
"8 McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2235-36. The standard form "Customer Agreement" pro-
vided:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or
relating to my accounts ... shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
rules ... of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. .... and/or the
American Stock Exchange, Inc. as I may elect.
McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1986).
19 McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2344. They contended that because racketeering is essen-
tially a criminal misdeed, RICO actions must be heard by the courts regardless of any prior
agreement to arbitrate, due to the "public interest in [its] enforcement." Id. The district
court ordered arbitration of the common law tort and Securities Exchange Act claims, but
not the RICO claims. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 389
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed as to the Exchange Act claims,
finding both claims to be non-arbitrable. See McMahon, 788 F.2d at 96-98.
20 McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2344-46. The Court reaffirmed a previous holding, emphasiz-
ing that "the fact that conduct can result in both criminal liability and treble damages does
not mean that there is not a bona fide civil action." Id. at 2344 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 (1985)).
21 Id. at 2345.
22 If punitive damages are deemed to include statutory treble damages, state courts
may find that the Supreme Court ruling mandates that they now permit the issue of puni-
tive damages to be settled by arbitration. See generally Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Sec.,
Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 500, 506, 495 N.E.2d 345, 348, 504 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (enforcement of Federal
Arbitration Act requires state courts to apply Supreme Court decisions, if available, or those
of lower federal courts if in agreement), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 402 (1986); Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Savin Bros., 45 App. Div. 2d 136, 145, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374, 382 (3d Dep't 1974),
aff'd per curiam, 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975) (court of appeals
upholds arbitration award of three times liquidated damages).
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CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES To PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRAL
AWARDS
Currently, three theories exist regarding the availability of pu-
nitive damages to arbitrating plaintiffs. Proponents of the first
view favor strict adherence to the Garrity court's holding and con-
tend that punitive damages should never be awarded in arbitration
proceedings.25 Proponents of the second theory, in contrast, would
allow the arbitrator to award punitive damages if both parties had
provided for them in their arbitration agreement.2 4 The final ap-
proach would permit arbitrators to grant punitive damages when-
ever deemed appropriate under the circumstances. This more lib-
eral view was adopted by the California Supreme Court in the
seminal case of Baker v. Sadick.25
The ruling of the New York Court of Appeals in Garrity"
prompted considerable debate as to whether one has a "right" to
punitive damages if clearly warranted under the circumstances.2 7
Since courts themselves have struggled with the applicability and
assessment of punitive liability,28 they have consequently been re-
luctant to sanction arbitration awards of punitive damages.29 The
proponents of Garrity argue that punitive damages should never
13 See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
215 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984); see infra notes 40-45 and accompa-
nying text; supra note 6.
28 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
27 See, e.g., Raymos, dupra note 1, at 258-59 (supporting use of punitive damages in
arbitration awards); Note, supra note 11, at 470-72 (broad sweep of Garrity holding im-
pugns previous case law).
Plaintiffs seeking to preempt a defendant's motion to compel arbitration on the ground
that arbitration forecloses them from their "right" to recover punitive damages have met
with little success. See, e.g., Sweater Bee By Banff, Ltd. v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 754 F.2d
457, 463 (2d Cir.) ("[n]or are we persuaded ... that arbitration would be prejudicial because
an award of punitive damages would be foreclosed that might otherwise be forthcoming
from the district court"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985); Baselski v. Paine, Webber, Jack-
son & Curtis, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535, 543 (N.D. IM. 1981) (arbitration would not result in
"forfeiture" of "right" of plaintiff to pursue punitive damages).
18 See, e.g., Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 1530, 1550 (5th
Cir. 1984) ("California law does not permit a plaintiff to recover punitive damages for
breach of contract"); Kennedy v. Thomsen, 320 N.W.2d 657, 659-60 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982)
(defendant's conduct found sufficiently analogous to "breach of trust" situation to justify
punitive liability); Cherry v. Turner, 560 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (no exem-
plary damages allowable absent recovery of actual damages); see also Hirschman, The Sec-
ond Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1360-
62 (1985) (addresses disagreement over applicability of New York rule to federal cases).
29 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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be awarded by any adjudicator other than a court of law, regard-
less of the existence of a prior agreement to the contrary." While
this reasoning can be supported by both public policy31 and due
process arguments, 2 the Garrity court focused solely on the public
policy rationale, asserting that a punitive damages award by an ar-
bitrator would contravene New York's policy of prohibiting the
"uncontrolled use of coercive economic sanctions in private
arrangements."3
Although courts adopting a strict Garrity approach find that
arbitrators may never award punitive damages as a remedy in com-
mercial disputes,"4 other jurisdictions have permitted punitive
damages to be granted at the arbitrator's discretion if the parties
expressly allowed for such awards in their arbitration agreement. 5
30 See Shahmnirzadi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 636 F. Supp. 49, 56 (D.D.C.
1985) (Garrity ruling followed); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assoc., 102 N.M. 607, 609, 698 P.2d 880,
882 (1985) (same). But see Neirs-Folkes, Inc. v. Drake Ins. Co., 75 App. Div. 2d 787, 788,
428 N.Y.S.2d 248, 250 (1st Dep't 1980) (courts should not intervene in arbitral awards
"where there are close conflicts between competing public policies, unless the award contra-
venes the stronger of them"), afl'd, 53 N.Y.2d 1038, 425 N.E.2d 875, 442 N.Y.S.2d 487
(1981). Garrity has also been adhered to in the context of labor arbitration. See School City
v. East Chicago Fed'n of Teachers, Local 511, 422 N.E.2d 656, 662-63 (Ind. App. 1981).
s' See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 359, 353 N.E.2d 793, 796, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831, 834 (1976). The court stated:
The court will vacate an award enforcing an illegal agreement or one violative
of public policy. Since enforcement of an award of punitive damages as a purely
private remedy would violate public policy, an arbitrator's award which imposes
punitive damages, even though agreed upon by the parties, should be vacated ....
If arbitrators were allowed to impose punitive damages, the usefulness of ar-
bitration would be destroyed. It would become a trap for the unwary given the
eminently desirable freedom from judicial overview of law and facts .... It would
lead to a Shylock principle of doing business without a Portia-like escape from the
vise of a logic foreign to arbitration law.
Id. at 357-59, 353 N.E.2d at 795-96, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832-34 (citations omitted).
In arriving at its decision, the court distinguished prior case law in which treble dam-
ages had been permitted, implicitly asserting that public policy considerations need not be
accounted for when applying statutorily mandated remedies. See id. at 357-58, 353 N.E.2d
at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833. But see id. at 363-64, 353 N.E.2d at 799, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 837
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (public policy may be manifested through statutes).
3' See supra notes 26-33.
See, e.g., Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, 824 (M.D.N.C.
1983). In Willis, plaintiff had invested funds in an account managed by the defendant cor-
poration which he claimed were fraudulently invested by the defendant. Their contract pro-
vided that "any controversy arising out of or relating to [the] accounts ... shall be settled
by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in effect of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. or ... the New York Stock Exchange . . . or the American Stock
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While an argument can be made that this second method brings
into play the best of both worlds-parties enjoying the right to re-
ceive what they bargained for, and states maintaining their police
powers to punish malevolent parties in all other circumstances-it
can be argued that the public's interest is not duly served when
arbitrators are permitted to award punitive damages." Indeed, it is
submitted that the state's power to punish is one that is not read-
fly transferrable to a panel of arbitrators because to do so trans-
grqsses important state interests.
The third view that has been advanced would advocate ex-
tending arbitrators' powers beyond the express authority granted
to them in the parties' predispute agreement.37 Courts following
this line of reasoning perceive broad arbitration clauses as bestow-
ing great discretion upon the arbitrator in fashioning a remedy. 8
Under this rationale, even if a contract has been entered into be-
cause of fraud, the arbitration clause may be severable, and thus
enforceable.3 9 Baker v. Sadick40 is the leading case supporting this
proposition.41 Baker involved a medical malpractice dispute which
had been sent to arbitration by way of a contract provision be-
Exchange." Id. at 822-23. Because of this broad arbitration agreement, the district court
found that the "provision includes claims for punitive damages." Id. at 824. The court
stated, "Hence, the parties by their contract have authorized any arbitrator who may hear
this matter to award punitive damages." Id. (emphasis added).
The Seventh Circuit has interpreted the Garrity ruling itself as espousing this view. See
Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1984) (only where puni-
tive damages are specifically mentioned in the contract may an arbitrator award them). Ar-
bitration awards under collective bargaining agreements have generally been subjected to
the same interpretation. See, e.g., Baltimore Regional Joint Bd. v. Webster Clothes, Inc.,
596 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1979) (where bargaining agreement does not contemplate punitive
damages they must be excluded from arbitral award).
" See Penna, supra note 11, at 1-2.
7 See, e.g., Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Constr., Inc., 676 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984) ("[i]ndependent tortious conduct constituting more than a malicious ... breach
of contract" supports arbitral award of exemplary damages). Arbitrators' imposition of pu-
nitive liability has been upheld in both contract, see Rodgers Builders, Inc., v. McQueen, 76
N.C. App. 16, 28-29, 331 S.E.2d 726, 734-35 (1985) (construction contract dispute), and tort
claims, see Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 684 (1984) (medi-
cal malpractice).
" See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing lack of procedural and substan-
tive restrictions on arbitrators).
" See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 411 (2d Cir.
1959). Where an arbitration contract is sufficiently broad to cover a fraud claim, exchanged
promises to arbitrate may permit the separation of the arbitration clause from the contract
and permit the parties to proceed to arbitration. Id.
10 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984).
41 See Note, infra note 49, at 313, 329-31.
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tween the defending surgeon and his patient.42 The California
Court of Appeals upheld the arbitrator's award of exemplary dam-
ages.43 The Baker court distinguished Garrity as based solely on a
contract action, holding that tortious misconduct is an acceptable
basis for punitive liability even in the context of an arbitration
proceeding. 44 The court's ruling was broad, concluding that any
matter voluntarily submitted to arbitration is a potential source of
punitive liability.45
It is submitted that while the strict approach of Garrity will
provide the most favorable results, it also implicitly raises more
questions than it answers,48 including the question of what consti-
tutes "public policy. '47 This is an important consideration because
many jurisdictions have utilized the public policy rationale to re-
strict the scope of authority an arbitrator may lawfully exercise.4 s
42 Baker, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 621-22, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 678. Liability for tort claims
generally will not be arbitrated since the parties rarely foresee tort actions in advance of
injury and, therefore, will not have agreed to arbitrate. However, if the tort issue arises in
connection with a contract, as in Baker, the courts will redress the breach of contract by
allowing the parties to proceed to arbitration. See Kilgore Mfg. Co. v. New Hampshire Fire
Ins. Co., 280 App. Div. 332, 335, 113 N.Y.S.2d 554, 557 (1952), aft'd, 305 N.Y. 815, 113
N.E.2d 558 (1953). If the tort claim is not directly related to the contract, generally it can-
not be arbitrated. See generally Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees
Local Union, 359 F.2d 598, 603 (2d Cir.) (absent express contract provision granting arbitra-
tor the power to hear tort claim, employer did not forego his statutory right to judicial
determination), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966).
" Baker, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
" Id. at 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 684. In refusing to follow Garrity, the California Court of
Appeals commented that since punitive damages are normally recoverable in medical mal-
practice actions, "[i]t strains legal imagination to conclude an agreement to substitute arbi-
tration for litigation results ipso facto in forbearance of a claim which would support an
award of punitive damages." Id.
45 Id.
41 Compare Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 357-58, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833 (pro-
hibition against arbitrator awarding punitive damages based on "strong public policy") with
id. at 363, 353 N.E.2d at 799, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting) ("public policy
against punitive damages is not so commanding that the Legislature has found it necessary
to embody that policy into law").
47 See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 571, 261 P.2d
721, 726 (1983) (term "public policy" inherently not subject to precise definition).
48 See supra note 33. Parties wishing to attack the arbitral award on public policy
grounds must do so in the early stages of the proceedings to ensure- favorable results. M.
DOMKE, supra note 3, § 33:03, at 469-71; see also Sweater Bee By Banff, Ltd. v. Manhattan
Indus., Inc., 754 F.2d 457, 460-64 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussion of policy arguments in favor of
and opposed to waiving arbitration when not asserted at earliest stage), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 819 (1985).
To restrict the arbitral award, parties are advised to do so at the outset in the predis-
pute arbitration agreement. See Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1137, 1144-46 (1986).
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While not lending itself to any precise definition,"9 "public policy"
is generally associated with the "social, moral, and physical condi-
tion of the community. ' 50 Its boundaries may best be ascertained
in state constitutions, legislation, 1 and case law.52 It is suggested
that public policy is a matter most fairly adjudged by the govern-
ment and one not to be left in private hands, since the private
sphere is too susceptible to its own biases and not sufficiently con-
cerned with the interest of the public at large.5 3
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS UNAFFECTED By THE McMahon
DECISION
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,5 the Su-
preme Court determined that arbitrators may lawfully arbitrate
disputes in which the plaintiffs, if successful, are to be recom-
In Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 389 N.E.2d 456, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1979), the
New York Court of Appeals recognized that only a few matters were "so intertwined with
overriding public policy considerations" as to merit judicial intervention, including: (1)
awards containing punitive damages; (2) matters regarding liquidation of insolvent insur-
ance companies when there exists a statute granting exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to
the state. Id. at 630, 389 N.E.2d at 459, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 977; see also Gross, Labor Relations
Law, 32 SYRACUSs L. REv. 389, 405 (1981) (New York Court of Appeals viewed as narrowing
bounds of arbitration by reviewing public policy considerations in public sector disputes).
4" See supra note 47; Note, Awarding Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice Arbi-
tration, 20 CAL. W.L. REv. 312, 322 n.77 (1984). Despite the term's indefiniteness, courts do
not possess unbridled freedom in making public policy determinations. See Haskin v. Secre-
tary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 565 F. Supp. 984, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). See
generally F. FROHOCK, PUBLIC POLICY SCOPE AND LOGIC § 1, at 11-12 (1979) (same).
50 Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111, 114 (W. Va. 1984); see
L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57, 60 (6th Cir. 1968); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear,
Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
81 See, e.g., Stevens Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Burgess, 202 So. 2d 498, 506 (La.
Ct. App. 1967) (statute requiring advertising and obtaining of competitive bids is "prohibi-
tive law founded on public policy"), afl'd, 252 La. 136, 209 So. 2d 733 (1968); Arbitration
Act § 10(a)-(c), 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)-(c) (1982) (grounds for vacating award include injuries
sustained from corrupt arbitrators).
512 In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 978 (Wyo. 1982). "When the constitution and
statutes have not spoken on a subject, public policy refers to a principle of law that holds no
one can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public." Id.
" See generally Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269, 271 (1983) (arbitrariness and prejudice of punitive damage
awards result from poor judicial procedures). Absent judicial curtailments on the remedies
available in the arbitral context, arbitrators may utilize their discretion in choosing an ap-
propriate form of relief. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. But see Drotning,
Arbitral Decisions: A Social Science Analog, 1984 Mo. J. oF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 77 (analo-
gizes social science decision making processes to those used in arbitral determinations).
107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
1988]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:270
pensed with statutory treble damages.5 5 It is submitted that the
holding of McMahon, though seemingly bestowing upon the arbi-
trator the authority to grant punitive awards, does not in fact ex-
tend that far, and that a restrictive interpretation of McMahon is
warranted because statutory treble damages, by nature, differ from
punitive damages in several significant respects.56 While it is con-
ceded that both punitive damages and statutory treble damages
serve similar functions-to deter future misconduct and punish
wrongdoers 57 -it is only when imposing punitive damages that a
judge must ascertain the relevant public policy issues.5 8 In addi-
tion, treble damages require a finding of actual damages,59 whereas
punitive liability will often be imposed even when only nominal
11 Id. at 2343, 2346; see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
51 Compare Glissman v. Rutt, 175 Ind. App. 493, 496, 372 N.E.2d 1188, 1190 (1978)
(civil litigant has no absolute right to punitive damages) with Life of Am. Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 1984) (litigant's statutory right to treble damages
award); see also Sherwood v. Graco, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 155, 158 (D. Colo. 1977) (punitive
damages awards rest upon court's power to punish, not victim's right to compensation). See
generally Recent Decisions, ARBITRATION: The Award of Punitive Damages as a Public
Policy Question-Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 546, 548-49 (1976)
(views of majority and dissenters in Garrity analyzed as a function of their differing inter-
pretations of punitive and treble damages).
5 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1978) (pur-
pose of imposing punitive liability is to punish reprehensible conduct); In re Air Crash Dis-
aster, 644 F.2d 594, 610 (7th Cir.) (punitive damages punish misconduct), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 878 (1981); Conchetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1978) (assessment of
punitive damages is usually to set an example and serve as a warning). Punitive damages
have been defined by one commentator as "any penalty, in money or property, exacted from
the defendant by a civil judgment primarily to deter him or others from engaging in similar
conduct or to punish him for engaging in such activity." See Wheeler, supra note 53, at 273.
" This is so because treble damages awards are made pursuant to statute. Omnibus
Housing Act, ch. 403, §§ 9, 51, as amd'g [1983] N.Y. Laws 732-741 (subtenant "entitled to
damages of three times the overcharge" of rent by original tenant); see Kolbert v. Clayton,
127 Misc. 2d 1036, 1037, 487 N.Y.S.2d 995, 995 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1985) ("fair
reading" of Omnibus Housing Act mandates granting of treble damages when violated); see
also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 49 (7th Cir. 1980) (prerequi-
site to punitive damages recovery is that public interest be served thereby); Glissman, 175
Ind. App. at 496, 372 N.E.2d at 1190 (punitive damages "awarded in furtherance of public
policy"); Davis v. Williams, 92 Misc. 2d 1051, 1055, 402 N.Y.S.2d 92, 95 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
Kings County 1977) (punitive damages serve policy of enforcing housing standards). One
federal court's public policy justification for exacting a punitive damages award against a
corporate defendant was the desire to bring "home" to those in positions of authority the
dire implications of their wrongdoings. Aldrich v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 756 F.2d
243, 247 (2d Cir. 1985).
"9 See, e.g., Stoner v. Houston, 265 Ark. 928, 933, 582 S.W.2d 28, 31 (1979) (court re-
versed treble damages recovery in action for injury to property because actual damages of
one dollar did not support such a remedy).
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injury has resulted.6 0 Recognizing these differences, courts will
often employ disparate standards in applying the two types of
damages. 1
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRAL
AWARDS
The bifurcated purpose in exacting punitive damages from a
defendant is both punishment and deterrence.2 While awarded
solely in civil actions, punitive damages generally impose a hard-
ship severe enough to justify characterizing them as "quasi-crimi-
nal." 3 In other contexts, the Supreme Court has noted that certain
sanctions may legitimately be treated as criminal in nature, though
not technically classified as such,6 thereby entitling the defendant
to numerous constitutional safeguards.6 5
The demands of procedural due process render uncertain the
constitutional validity of punitive damages, particularly in light of
the fact that punitive damages have often been criticized as being
rendered in an arbitrary and capricious fashion by overly sympa-
thetic juries16 The issues raised thereby become even more com-
60 See United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). But see Winkle v. Grand Nat'l Bank, 267 Ark. 123, 138, 601
S.W.2d 559, 565 (punitive damages recovery prohibited absent actual damages), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 880 (1980); Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 893, 275 S.E.2d 632, 638 (1981)
(punitive damages disallowed against real estate developer in defamation action because
plaintiff did not show "clear and convincing evidence" of actual injury).
61 See, e.g., Edwards v. Travelers Ins., 563 F.2d 105, 119 (6th Cir. 1977) (reviewing dif-
ferent standards of liability under Tennessee's common law punitive damages remedy as
opposed to its statutory treble damages award). In comparison, consequential damages can
be awarded only if parties give the arbitrator such authority. See Bradigan v. Bishop
Homes, Inc., 20 App. Div. 2d 966, 966, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1019 (4th Dep't 1964).
62 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
241, 264-65 (1985); Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72
VA. L. REV. 139, 141-42 (1986).
64 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 n.37 (1977); see also Jeffries, supra note
63, at 148 (cruel and unusual punishment implications arise in excessive punitive damages
liability). Treble damages, on the other hand, are generally not considered "criminal punish-
ment." See United States v. Countryside Farms, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1150, 1159 (D. Utah
1977).
65 See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Proce-
dures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269, 276 (1983); see also Jeffries, supra note 63, at 139-41 (recent mass
tort cases prove that juries' punitive damages awards have run "out of control"). The four-
teenth amendment specifically provides that "[n]o Sate shall make or enforce any law
which shall... deprive any person of... property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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pelling when punitive liability is assessed in the context of an arbi-
trated dispute.67 The "fundamental fairness" requirement of
fourteenth amendment due process, for instance, is not safe-
guarded by arbitral procedures as generally employed."8 Moreover,
a "heavy-handed" punitive damages award may bear such a dis-
turbing resemblance to criminal sanctions as to implicate both the
eighth amendment 9 and the civil litigant's right of appeal.70 When
punitive damages are imposed by an arbitrator, there are a limited
number of instances in which a judge will possess jurisdiction to
ensure that such rights are not being violated. 1
Of critical concern is protecting the civil defendant's seventh
amendment right to a jury trial." Although defendants charged
with serious federal crimes may waive their right to a trial by
jury,7 13 courts are reluctant, out of concern for the defendant, to
allow a waiver of a jury trial where the circumstances would other-
wise clearly warrant one.74 It is submitted that because they clearly
resemble criminal sanctions, punitive damages must not be permit-
ted outside the protective eye of the judiciary.h
CONCLUSION
Courts have come a long way from the time when they consid-
ered arbitration a usurpation of their jurisdictional power over via-
17 See Saunders, The Quest for Balance: Public Policy and Due Process in Medical
Malpractice Arbitration Agreements, 23 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 267, 272-280 (1986).
68 See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 332 (5th Cir. 1981) (court employs
"fairness" test before allowing punitive damages). "The fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965)). But see Britton, Judicial Review and Enforcement of the Arbitration Award,
16 TmL, Mar. 1980, at 22, 25 (difficult to prove violation of due process by arbitration).
69 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Id.
70 See Raymos, supra note 1, at 256. "Congress, by statute, has indicated a reluctance
to upset arbitration awards by allowing only narrow grounds for review of arbitration
awards." Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10-11 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
1 See 9 U.S.C. § 10-11 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
72 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment provides: "In Suits at common law,
... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law." Id.
7' Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965).
74 See id. Waiver will only be allowed when the defendant expressly and intelligently
consents to the waiver and the Gofernment and a responsible trial judge acquiesce. Id. at
24.
'" See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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ble disputes. Today, parties can usually be confident that their
contractual arrangements to arbitrate claims will be enforced by
the courts. Nonetheless, parties must not confuse their own right
to undergo extra-judicial dispute resolution with the state's exclu-
sive authority to dispense punishment. Whereas the former is a
function of contract law, the latter is derived from public policy
and due process principles. Hence, notwithstanding the parties'
prior agreement, arbitrators must be prevented from granting pu-
nitive damages in commercial arbitration awards.
Karen Ruga
